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Introduction	
	August	9,	2007	is	widely	regarded	as	the	starting	date	of	the	global	financial	crisis.	BNP	Paribas	stopped	trading	in	three	of	its	investment	funds	exposed	to	the	U.S.	sub-prime	mortgage	markets	as	the	liquidity	in	these	markets	had	all	but	dried	up.				Liquidity	is	a	relevant	factor	for	the	supply	side	of	funds:	the	lenders’	side.	This	group	is	comprised	of	banks,	hedge	funds,	asset	managers,	pension	funds	and	also	affluent	private	investors.		The	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2007-2008	 was	 a	 lenders’	 crisis.	 Generally,	 banks	 had	insufficient	capital	to	absorb	the	losses	created	by	the	reduced	liquidity	levels	in	the	financial	markets.	Central	banks	had	to	step	in	to	rescue	quite	a	few	of	them.		The	fact	is,	however,	that	underlying	the	financial	crisis	of	2007-2008	was	the	far	less	publicized	 one	 experienced	 by	 borrowers.	 In	 the	 U.S.,	 over	 the	 years	 1997-2007,	households	had	to	borrow	an	ever-growing	percentage	of	their	earnings	in	order	to	get	themselves	on	the	property	ladder	or	rent	a	home.	Long	before	2007,	in	fact	by	2003,	 the	 additional	 amount	 that	 a	 household	 had	 to	 borrow	 on	 average	 to	 get	 a	home	was	equal	 to	a	 full	year	of	earnings.	At	best	 sluggish	average	 income	growth	was	 met	 with	 rampant	 mortgage	 volume	 growth.	 This	 imperiled	 borrowers	 who	were	 forced	 to	 allocate	 increasing	 percentages	 of	 their	 earnings	 to	 servicing	mortgage	debts	or	renting	a	home.		The	 notion	 that	 lenders	will	 rein	 in	 their	 lending	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 free	market	competition	 is	 a	 fallacy.	The	key	 factor	 is	not	 the	price	of	 funds	borrowed,	but	 the	volume	of	 funds	lent	per	time	period	in	comparison	to	average	household’	nominal	income	growth.		The	 consequences	 of	 a	 borrowers’	 crisis	 are	 different	 from	 a	 financial	 markets’	liquidity	one.	When	households	have	to	allocate	an	increasing	share	of	their	income	to	either	buy	or	rent	a	home,	fewer	funds	are	available	to	spend	on	other	goods	and	services.	 When	 households	 are	 subsequently	 confronted	 with	 foreclosure	 and	ultimately	repossession	of	homes,	they	lose	most	or	all-past	savings	accumulated	in	the	 home.	 The	 poor	 get	 poorer,	 both	 in	 income	 and	 asset	 values	 terms.	 The	 gap	between	the	haves	and	the	have-nots	widens	dramatically.		While	volume	of	lending	control	and	to	some	extent	rent	controls	can	prevent	a	new	financial	 crisis	 occurring,	 more	 measures	 are	 needed	 to	 overcome	 a	 borrowers’	crisis;	to	shut	the	stable	door	before	the	horse	has	bolted.							
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1.	The	income-house	price	gap	in	the	U.S.	over	the	period	1996-2016	
		A	borrowers’	crisis	does	not	develop	overnight,	but	may	take	a	number	of	years	before	 the	 storm	 signals	 are	 raised.	 Over	 the	 period	 1996-2007,	 such	 storm	signals	were	ignored.	As	table	1,	below,	indicates:	in	2003	the	median	nominal	household	 income	 in	 the	 U.S.	 could	 afford	 a	 house	 price	 of	 $203,089.	 Such	affordability	 level	 indicates	 that	 income	available	 for	other	goods	and	services	grows	equally	with	the	increase	in	such	household	income:	there	is	therefore	no	forced	 shift	 in	 the	 spending	 pattern.	 In	 2003,	 the	 actual	 average	 home	 sales	price	 in	 the	U.S	was	 $246,300.	On	 average	 each	household	entering	 the	home	market	would	need	 to	 borrow	an	 additional	 $43,211	 to	 acquire	 a	 home.	 Such	amount	 was	 equal	 to	 a	 year’s	 average	 income	 in	 2003.	 What	 should	 also	 be	considered	 is	 that	 median	 income	 households	 cannot	 spend	 100%	 of	 their	income	on	debt	servicing.	They	usually	spend	around	40%	on	housing	costs.	If	so,	 the	 $43,211	 should	 be	 seen	 in	 this	 context.	 It	 translates	 in	 2.5	 times	 the	$43,211	or	$108,000	in	future	debt	commitments.		How	 new	 home	 buyers	 were	 affected,	 differed	 from	 year	 to	 year.	 The	 lucky	buyers	were	the	ones	who	had	the	opportunity	to	buy	a	home	in	1997	and	1998.	From	 1999	 on,	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 average	 home	 sales	 price	 and	 the	affordability	price,	based	on	nominal	average	income	levels,	started	to	deviate.	The	money	allocated	 to	mortgage	 lending	over	 the	period	1999-2003	doubled	from	 $524	 billion	 in	 1999	 to	 $1.112	 trillion	 by	 2003.	 Such	 increased	 lending	levels	 had	 a	 somewhat	 positive	 effect	 on	 the	 volume	 of	 new	 housing	 starts,	especially	 for	 2003;	 however	 most	 of	 the	 increased	 lending	 influenced	 the	average	home	sales	price	over	the	period	1999-2003.		This	 excess	 in	 funding	 resulted	 in	 a	 situation	 that	by	1999,	 the	 average	home	sales	price	in	the	U.S.	was	2.5%	over	the	income	based	affordability	home	price.	By	 2000	 the	 percentage	 had	 increased	 to	 5.15%,	 in	 2001	 to	 7.22%,	 a	 further	increase	 followed	 in	 2002	 to	 15.02%	 and	 the	 percentage	 reached	 21.27%	 by	2003.	 As	 no	 action	 was	 taken	 to	 stem	 this	 rapid	 increase	 in	 the	 volume	 of	lending,	actual	home	prices	moved	up	faster	than	the	income	affordability	ones;	by	2007	this	affordability	gap	had	grown	to	33.1%.	This	meant	that	by	2007,	on	average,	 an	 extra	 amount	 had	 to	 be	 borrowed	 of	 over	 1.5	 times	 the	 median	household	nominal	annual	income	for	each	new	homeowner.	It	also	meant	that	average	rental	prices	went	up,	so	that	a	large	number	of	households	were	forced	to	allocate	a	disproportionate	level	of	their	income	to	either	buying	or	renting	a	place.		The	income-house	price	gap	does	not	develop	overnight.	It	also	does	not	affect	all	 borrowers	 in	 the	 same	 way.	 Early	 borrowers,	 those	 who	 entered	 into	 a	mortgage	 commitment	 in	 1996-1997,	 were	 much	 better	 off	 than	 those	 who	entered	 between	 2003-2007.	 Households,	 who	 owned	 their	 homes	 outright,	were	even	less	affected	in	their	spending	power	out	of	current	incomes.	
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																																																																																				A	borrower-led	economic	policy©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		The	 real	 threat	 to	 the	 U.S.	 economy	 originated	 from	 the	 gradual	 shift	 in	disposable	 income	 levels	 for	 individual	 households,	 after	 the	 impact	 of	increasing	 costs	 of	 mortgages	 were	 taken	 into	 account	 relative	 to	 incomes	earned.	 This	 threat	 is	 based	 on	 the	 limits	 in	 the	 earning	 capacity	 of	 each	individual	household.	No	household	can	force	an	employer	to	pay	more	for	their	services.	 As	 incomes	 experience	 limits	 set	 by	 the	 labor	markets,	 expenses	 for	mortgage	 or	 renting	 purposes	 will	 also	 need	 to	 fall	 in	 line	 with	 such	 income	growth,	 otherwise	 real	 consumption	 levels	 will	 drop	 and	 more	 and	 more	borrowers	 will	 experience	 debt	 servicing	 problems.	 Ultimately	 economic	growth	will	slow	down	or	–in	the	worst	case	scenario	like	in	2008-	will	collapse.			Table	1,	 below,	 illustrates	 the	 cliff	 edge	 results	 of	 the	mortgage-lending	boom	over	 the	 period	 1996-2008,	 with	 the	 cliff	 being	 passed	 in	 2008.	 Nominal	mortgage	lending	levels	in	2016	were	still	below	the	2001	levels.	New	housing	starts	 in	 2016	 were	 still	 below	 the	 1996	 levels,	 some	 20	 years	 earlier.	Unemployment	rates	doubled	from	5%	to	10%	over	the	18	months	from	early	2008.	 It	 took	to	April	2016	to	get	back	to	the	5%	level	again.	Equally	bad	was	the	 impact	 the	 crisis	 had	 on	 real	 household	 median	 incomes.	 According	 to	Sentier	Research,	the	real	median	household	income	in	the	U.S.	reached	$59,190	in	January	2008.	After	a	substantial	drop	in	the	years	to	2017,	it	now	stands	at	$59,345	 as	 in	 May	 2017.	 For	 nine	 years	 there	 has	 been	 no	 growth	 in	 real	incomes.		Perhaps	the	time	has	come	to	consider	how	a	borrowers’	crisis	can	be	identified	and	 defused,	 rather	 than	 focusing	 on	 the	 antecedent	 rescue	 of	 the	 banking	sector	and	the	implementation	of	myriad	lender-led	policies.		
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Table	 1:	 The	 developments	 of	 volume	 of	 mortgage	 lending,	 annual	 housing	starts,	average	U.S.	home	sales	price,	nominal	median	income	of	households	and	U.S.	home	sale	prices	based	on	such	incomes					
	
Year	
	
									1	
Volume	of	
Home	mortgage	
Lending	
X	U.S.$	billion	
	
						2	
Annual	
Housing	starts	
X	thousands	
							3	
Average	U.S.	
Home	sales	
price	
X	U.S.	dollars	
					4	
Median	
Household	
Nominal	
Income	
X	U.S.	dollars	
							5	
Income	
Affordability	
House	price	
X	U.S.	dollars	
1996	 				329	 1370	 166,400	 35,492	 	
1997	 			341	 1566	 176,200	 37,005	 173,494	
1998	 			437	 1792	 181,900	 38,885	 182,308	
1999	 				524	 1708	 195,600	 40,696	 190,798	
2000	 			544	 1532	 207,000	 41,990	 196,864	
2001	 			685	 1568	 213,200	 42,228	 197,980	
2002	 			907	 1788	 228,700	 42,409	 198,828	
2003	 	1112	 2057	 246,300	 43,318	 203,089	
2004	 	1211	 2042	 274,500	 44,334	 207,852	
2005	 	1351	 1994	 297,000	 46,326	 217,233	
2006	 	1327	 1649	 305,900	 48,201	 226,025	
2007	 	1057	 1037	 313,600	 50,233	 235,553	
2008	 			319	 		560	 292,600	 50,303	 235,881	
2009	 			186	 		581	 270,900	 49,777	 233,414	
2010	 	-167	 		539	 272,900	 49,276	 231,065	
2011	 			104	 		694	 263,400	 50,054	 234,713	
2012	 			105	 		976	 285,400	 51,017	 239,229	
2013	 				223	 1010	 319,300	 53,585	 251,271	
2014	 				312	 1081	 312,500	 53,657	 251,609	
2015	 				407	 1160	 352,500	 55,775	 261,541	
2016	 				596	 1226	 384,000	 	 				
	
2.	The	implications	of	an	income-house	price	gap	
	The	fact	that,	by	2007	as	compared	to	1997,	a	household	had	to	borrow	an	extra	amount	 of	 1.5	 years	 average	 nominal	 income,	 just	 to	 afford	 to	 buy	 a	 home,	implies	that	an	income	gap	was	created	between	the	1997	buyers	and	the	2007	ones.	The	2007	buyers,	and	also	the	buyers	from	1999	to	2007,	were	the	victims	of	 the	unfettered	 increase	 in	mortgage	 lending.	Each	of	 these	 latter	buyers	was	made	worse	 off	 than	 the	1997	buyers	 and	 those	before	 them.	They,	 the	1999-2007	buyers,	had	to	take	on	a	mortgage	amount	that	represented	a	considerably	higher	 percentage	 of	 their	 nominal	 income	 than	 the	 1997	 and	 previous	generations.	 The	 nominal	 income	 amount	 can	 only	 be	 spent	 once	 and	 if	more	funds	 need	 to	 be	 allocated	 to	 a	 relatively	 higher	 mortgage	 amount	 or	 higher	rents,	 the	 result	will	 be	 that	 less	 is	 available	 for	 spending	 on	 other	 goods	 and	services.	 Such	 a	 shift	 in	 allocation	 represents	 not	 only	 a	 loss	 in	 drivers	 of	economic	growth,	but	equally	a	shift	 from	the	poorer	 to	 the	richer	classes.	The	poor	become	poorer	and	 the	 rich	 relatively	 richer,	 simply	as	a	 result	of	 excess	lending.	
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																																																																																					A	borrower-led	economic	policy©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		There	is	no	doubt	that	if	the	stable	door	is	left	open	and	a	borrowers’	crisis	left	to	unfold,	the	horse	will	bolt	in	the	shape	of	a	lenders’	crisis.	If	a	sufficient	number	of	households	cannot	afford	to	repay	the	loans	that	have	been	granted	to	them,	the	 lenders	 will	 have	 to	 absorb	 the	 losses.	 Such	 lenders	 could	 be	 holders	 of	mortgage-backed	 securities,	 banks,	 pension	 funds,	 insurance	 companies,	 hedge	funds	and	investors	in	mutual	funds	or	wealthy	individual	investors.			It	is	clear	from	the	statistics	of	foreclosures	and	repossessions	in	the	U.S.	that	all	these	fund	providers	will	do	everything	in	their	legal	powers	to	force	borrowers	to	pay	up	the	maximum	they	can	or,	in	case	they	cannot,	take	over	their	property	through	repossession	procedures.		What	 is	also	clear	 is	 that	 there	can	be	different	solutions	 to	solve	a	borrowers’	crisis,	especially	one	that	 is	caused	by	the	 lenders	collectively,	rather	than	wait	for	 the	 lenders	 to	 take	 legal	 actions	 that	multiply	 the	 effects	 of	 such	 excessive	lending.		
3.	The	lenders’	crisis	“solutions”	
	The	 2008	 financial	 crisis	 in	 the	 U.S.	 laid	 bare	 a	 number	 of	 weaknesses	 in	 the	structure	and	organization	of	the	financial	system.			U.S.	 banking	 supervision	 was	 spread	 over	 several	 agencies	 preventing	 a	coordinated	approach	to	action	taking.		Big	banks	and	insurance	companies	regarded	themselves	as	“too	big	to	fail”	and	expected	 government	 cash	 injections	 in	 case	 doubtful	 debtors	 exceeded	 their	capital	 levels.	 Their	mix	 of	 commercial	 and	 investment	 banking	 activities	 -the	latter	 including	 own	 risk	 positions	 taking,	 which	 was	 regarded	 by	 many	 as	authorized	gambling-	did	 create	 losses	not	only	on	ordinary	 loans,	 but	 also	on	many	synthetic	products	barely	understood	by	outsiders.		The	 big	U.S.	 investment	 banks	 had	 taken	 advantage	 of	 the	 fast	 increase	 in	 the	volume	 of	mortgage	 lending	 over	 the	 period	 2001-2007.	 Especially	 from	2004	these	 brokerage	 houses	 created	 synthetic	 products	 that	 could	 be	 sold	 to	investors	around	 the	world.	Many	 included	sub-prime	mortgage	 loans.	The	big	brokerage	houses	took	on	enormous	debts;	so	much	so	that	their	debt	to	capital	ratios	had	deteriorated	to	32	to	1	by	20071.	A	failure	by	any	one	of	these	brokers	could	lead	to	a	liquidity	crisis,	which	it	did	by	August	2008.		Credit	 rating	 agencies	 clearly	 failed	 in	 their	 duties	 to	 protect	 investors	 from	excessive	risk	 taking,	as	many	 investment	products	had	an	AA	or	 triple	A	 level	ratings	attached	to	them,	which	turned	out	to	be	erroneous.																																																										1https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/133337/too-big-to-fail/	
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																																																																																																																																													A	borrower-led	economic	policy©Drs	Kees	De	Koning			The	 Federal	 Reserve	 in	 coordination	with	 the	 U.S.	 Treasury	 took	 a	 number	 of	steps	to	countenance	the	impending	financial	crisis.				In	November	2008,	Quantitative	Easing	–the	action	of	buying	up	of	U.S.	Treasury	bonds	 and	Mortgage	Backed	 Securities-	 started.	 	 In	 total	 $4.2	 trillion	 of	 bonds	were	 bought	 up	 over	 a	 period	 of	 three	 years,	 split	 over	 $2.8	 trillion	 Treasury	bonds	and	$1.4	trillion	mortgage	backed	bonds.		At	the	date	of	writing	this	paper	-October	2017-,	the	$4.2	trillion	were	still	on	the	books	of	the	Fed.		The	second	step	was	a	lowering	of	the	effective	Funds	rate	by	the	Fed.	Over	the	year	2008	the	rate	was	lowered	from	3.94%	in	January	2008	to	0.15%	in	January	2009.		The	 third	 step	 was	 to	 create	 stronger	 legislation	 to	 address	 some	 of	 the	weaknesses	in	managing	the	financial	system.	The	Dodd-Frank	Act	was	enacted	in	July	2010.	Banks	were	forced	to	improve	their	debt	to	equity	ratios.		In	2008	 in	 the	U.S.,	 but	 also	 in	other	 countries	 including	 the	U.K.,	 the	 financial	authorities	gave	maximum	attention	to	stabilizing	the	financial	sector,	especially	focusing	on	the	banking	sector	and	some	insurance	companies.			
	
The	pre-crisis	interest	rate	policies.	
	U.S.	 financial	 authorities	maintained	 that	 a	 volume	 of	 lending	 excess	 could	 be	rectified	by	an	 interest	 rate	 correction.	Table	2	 reflects	 the	effective	Fed	 funds	rate	over	the	period	January	1996-January	20092.		
	
Table	2:	Effective	Fed	funds	rate	January	1996-	January	2009			
Date	 Effective	
Fed	funds	rate	%	
Date	 Effective	
Fed	funds	rate	%	January	1996	 5.56	 January	2003	 1.24	January	1997	 5.25	 January	2004	 1.00	January	1998	 5.56	 January	2005	 2.28	January	1999	 4.63	 January	2006	 4.29	January	2000	 5.45	 January	2007	 5.25	January	2001	 5.98	 January	2008	 3.94	January	2002	 1.73	 January	2009	 0.15																																																											2	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS	
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																																																																																																																																	A	borrower-led	economic	policy©Drs	Kees	De	Koning			The	 conclusion	 to	 be	 drawn	 from	 table	 1	 and	 table	 2	 combined	 is	 that	 the	lowering	of	the	base	rate	from	5.98%	by	January	2001	to	1.73%	by	January	2002	certainly	achieved	the	effect	of	increasing	the	volume	of	mortgage	lending	from	$685	 billion	 in	 2001	 to	 $907	 billion	 in	 2002	 and	 $1.112	 trillion	 in	 2003.	However,	 what	 was	 not	 fully	 appreciated	 at	 the	 time	 was	 that	 lowering	 the	interest	rate	had	a	substantial	price	effect	on	house	prices.	As	table	1	indicates,	it	encouraged	 average	 home	 sales	 prices	 to	 increase	 faster	 than	 the	 income	affordability	 house	 prices.	 This	 trend,	 which	 started	 in	 1999	 and	 continued	slowly	through	2000	and	2001,	accelerated	strongly	in	2002	and	2003.			In	 2002	 and	 2003,	 the	 act	 to	 stimulate	 economic	 growth	 by	 lowering	 interest	rates	 simultaneously	 undermined	 the	 capacity	 of	 new	 home	 owners	 and	 rent	paying	households	to	maintain	their	spending	levels	out	of	current	incomes.	This	negative	 effect	 on	 household	 income	 levels	 was	 an	 immediate	 result	 of	 the	volume	 of	 mortgage	 lending	 exceeding	 the	 capacity	 of	 households	 to	 increase	their	nominal	incomes.		Neither	 in	2003,	nor	 in	 later	years	to	2008,	was	a	policy	 introduced	to	restrain	lenders	by	reducing	the	growth	in	home	mortgage	volumes	to	within	the	limits	of	the	nominal	income	growth	levels	of	U.S.	households.	By	2007-2008,	many	U.S	households	were	confronted	with	a	liquidity	crisis	as	a	result	of	their	mortgage	borrowings.	This	was	not	a	result	of	their	own	making,	but	a	direct	consequence	of	 the	 volume	 of	 mortgage	 lending	 that	 far	 exceeded	 the	 growth	 in	 median	nominal	 household	 incomes.	 Excessive	 lending	 volumes	 in	 themselves	 had	 a	destructive	effect	on	economic	growth	levels.			
Some	observations	about	the	solutions	to	the	lenders’	crisis.	
	Pre-crisis,	the	price	of	money	was	substantially	lowered	from	5.98%	in	January	2001	to	1.73%	by	January	2002.	This	price	 lowering	had	a	strong	effect	on	the	volume	 of	 mortgage	 funds	 supplied	 to	 individual	 households.	 The	 latter	expanded	by	34.5%	in	a	single	year	in	2002	over	2001.	In	2003,	the	growth	rate	was	even	higher	at	62.3%	over	2001	 levels	and	 for	2004-2007	such	expansion	was	even	higher	as	compared	to	2001.	Between	2001	and	2007	the	U.S.	nominal	median	income	levels	grew	by	18.95%.	Over	the	period	2001-2007,	the	volume	of	new	mortgage	funds	supplied	to	U.S.	households	overwhelmed,	by	a	very	large	margin,	the	income	growth	figures.		To	 illustrate	 this	diverging	gap	with	some	different	 figures:	 in	2001,	 the	actual	house	 price	was	 $15,220	 higher	 than	 the	 affordable	 house	 price	 for	 a	median	income	household.		The	$15,220	represented	36%	of	the	annual	median	income	in	 2001.	 By	 2007	 the	 actual	 house	 price	was	 $78,042	 higher	 than	 the	 income	affordable	 one.	 This	 represented	155%	of	 the	nominal	median	 income	 level	 in	2007.	By	2007,	the	average	mortgage	borrower	had	to	take	out	an	extra		
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																																																																																																																																	A	borrower-led	economic	policy©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		mortgage	 volume	 equal	 to	 more	 than	 1.5	 times	 his	 median	 annual	 nominal	income	compared	to	home	mortgage	borrowers	in	1997.	Such	extra	debt	load	for	homeowners	(or	renters)	meant	that	the	house	price	inflation	levels	–supported	by	 low	 interest	 rates-	 weakened	 the	 financial	 position	 of	 each	 and	 every	household	at	or	below	the	median	income	over	the	period	2001-2007.	More	debt	taken	on	than	was	either	necessary	by	historical	standards	or	manageable	only	served	to	make	the	poor	poorer.		No	preventive	action	was	 taken	 to	 slow	down	 the	volume	of	mortgage	 lending	over	the	period	2001-2007.																																																																																							
4.	Some	ideas	about	how	to	solve	a	borrowers’	crisis	
	Is	 it	 not	 a	 troubling	 irony	 that	 the	 two	 major	 solutions	 to	 the	 lenders’	 crisis:	Quantitative	easing	and	a	further	lowering	of	interest	rates	added	insult	to	injury	for	the	median	nominal	income	households	fortunate	enough	to	remain	in	a	job	after	 2008.	 In	 2008,	 this	 income	 level	 was	 $50,303	 and	 only	 by	 2012	 did	 it	exceed	the	2008	level	to	$51,017.			With	 the	 lowest	 interest	 rate	 on	 record	 at	 0.15	%,	U.S.	 households	 collectively	reduced	 their	 outstanding	 mortgage	 lending	 level	 by	 well	 over	 10%	 over	 the	period	2008-2015	or	in	actual	amounts	by	$1.24	trillion	from	the	high	of	$10.712	trillion	over	the	period	Quarter	1	2008	to	$9.471	trillion	over	Quarter	2	2015.		U.S.	 households	 that	 fell	 into	 payment	 arrears	were	 pursued	 through	 the	 legal	system.	It	 is	 important	to	mention	that	a	 legal	system	can	replace	economically	sensible	measures.	This	was	made	clear	in	the	latest	financial	stability	report	of	the	Bank	of	England.	The	Bank	of	England	 in	 its	 latest	2017	Financial	 Stability	Report3	has	developed	a	diagram	of	a	“self-reinforcing	feed	back	loop”.	It	shows	the	 potential	 relationship	 between	 an	 adverse	 house	 price	 fall,	 its	 collateral	effect,	 the	 reaction	of	 the	banking	 community	 in	 reducing	 the	 supply	of	 credit,	the	 expectation	 of	 further	 house	 price	 drops	 and	 “fire	 sales”	 and	 the	reinforcement	of	an	adverse	house	price	shock.		
																																																								3	http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/fsr/2017/jun.aspx		
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																																																																																															The	Bank	of	England’s	report	expresses	a	fear	that	the	“self-reinforcing	feedback	loop”	can	be	the	cause	of	a	next	financial	crisis.	It	is	recommending	steps	to	force	banks	to	increase	their	capital	buffers	against	such	adverse	events.		The	situation	in	the	U.K.	differs	 in	one	major	aspect	from	that	 in	the	U.S.	 In	the	U.K.,	for	many	years,	not	enough	new	homes	were	built	to	satisfy	the	needs	of	the	growing	population.	Such	undersupply	creates	an	artificial	scarcity	effect,	which	pushes	house	prices	up	far	in	excess	of	average	income	growth.	In	the	U.S.,	over	the	period	1997-2007,	the	volume	of	new	housing	starts	was	well	in	line	with	the	population	 growth	 over	 that	 period,	 but	 the	 growth	 in	 mortgage	 lending	 far	exceeded	the	average	growth	in	incomes.		In	the	U.S.	the	first	adverse	shock	came	from	the	number	of	households	unable	to	continue	 to	 service	 their	mortgage	 debt	 by	 2007-2008.	 The	 legal	 system	 took	over	through	foreclosure	proceedings	and	repossessions.		Table	3	gives	an	overview	of	U.S.	foreclosure	proceedings	started,	completed	and	repossessions.		
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Table	 3:	 Foreclosure	 filings,	 foreclosures	 and	 home	 repossessions	 in	 the	
U.S.	2004-2016		
Year							Foreclosure						Completed												Home		
																Filings																Foreclosures								Repossessions			2016	 					956,864	 								427,997	 														203,108	2015	 		1,083,572	 								569.825	 														449,900	2014	 		1,117,426	 								575,378	 														327,069	2013	 		1,369,405	 								921,064	 														463,108	2012	 		2,300,000	 					2,100,000	 														700,000	2011	 		3,920,418	 					3,580,000	 											1,147,000	2010	 		3,843,548	 					3,500,000	 											1,125,000	2009	 		3,457,643	 					2,920,000	 														945,000	2008	 		3,019,482	 					2,350,000	 														679,000	2007	 		2,203,295	 					1,260,000	 														489,000	2006	 		1,566,398	 								973,000	 														356,000	2005	 		1,126,637	 								773,000	 														312,000	2004	 					948,031	 								582,000	 														274,000		 	
	The	above	table	shows	clearly	that	already	by	2006	over	1.5	million	households	got	 into	 financial	difficulties	due	 to	mortgage	borrowings,	a	65%	increase	over	2004.	Over	the	period	2006-2014	22.9	million	households	were	confronted	with	foreclosure	filings.	Over	the	same	period	6.2	million	homes	were	repossessed.	Is	it	 any	 surprise	 that	over	 the	period	2007-2016	new	housing	 starts	dropped	of	the	scale?	
	
The	magic	question	
	Could	 the	 borrowers’	 crisis	 have	 been	 avoided?	 The	 answer	 is	 a	 definite	 yes.	Restraining	mortgage-lending	 levels,	when	 their	 growth	 exceeds	 the	 growth	 in	median	 incomes	 would	 be	 a	 start.	 Comparing	 income	 growth	 levels	 with	mortgage	 lending	 levels	 is	 not	 rocket	 science.	 However,	 no	 specific	 mortgage	lending	control	measures	were	taken	over	the	period	2001-2008.	The	common	opinion	was	 that	 interest	rate	movements	would	help	 to	control	 the	volume	of	lending.	 The	 common	 failure	 was	 not	 to	 spot	 and	 act	 upon	 the	 danger	 to	household	 finances	 that	 was	 caused	 by	 actual	 house	 prices	 rising	 faster	 than	income	growth	levels.		The	 second	 main	 question	 is:	 Could	 the	 adjustment	 period	 have	 been	 better	handled.	My	answer	is	a	definite	yes.		It	is	a	fundamental	mistake	to	rely	upon	the	legal	system	to	resolve	an	economic	malfunction.	The	mistake	 in	question	was	 that	over	 the	period	2002-2008,	U.S.	households	had	to	dedicate	an	ever-increasing	percentage	of	their	incomes	to		
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																																																																																																																																			A	borrower-led	economic	policy©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		servicing	mortgage	debts	 or	 pay	 higher	 rents.	 This	 should	not	 have	 happened.	However	it	did.	The	debt	recovery	process	did	not	use	economic	means	to	solve	the	 crisis,	 but	 legal	 means	 of	 foreclosure	 filings,	 completed	 foreclosures	 and	home	 repossessions.	 The	Bank	of	 England’s	 feedback	 loop	worked	perfectly	 in	this	 way,	 to	 the	 great	 detriment	 of	 individual	 households.	 With	 falling	 house	prices,	 households	 had	 even	 less	 of	 a	 chance	 of	 any	 recovery	 of	 accumulated	savings	in	the	home.	The	poor	were	forced	into	deeper	poverty.	As	stated	above,	this	was	not	due	to	a	fault	of	their	own	making.		There	 is	 another	 option,	 an	 economic	 one	 and	 one	 actually	 quite	 similar	 to	providing	liquidity	to	the	banking	sector,	when	it	ran	into	financial	problems.	It	can	be	described	as	a	liquidity	support	system	for	individual	households.	In	 a	 previous	 paper:	 “How	 the	 financial	 crisis	 could	 have	 been	 averted”4,	 the	writer	already	illustrated	such	suggestion.	The	option	could	be	used	when	a	cap	on	mortgage-lending	levels	had	not	been	enforced.	In	such	case	the	setting	up	of	a	National	Mortgage	Bank	was	recommended	to	help	households	overcome	their	liquidity	squeeze.	Such	an	NMB	could	act	as	a	lender	of	last	resort	for	individual	households	on	basis	of	sharing	part	of	the	asset	(the	home)	with	the	NMB	for	its	cash-flow	help.	Such	help	should	be	differentiated	for	each	income	class	that	an	individual	 household	 belongs	 to.	 Low-income	 earners	 should	 be	 helped	 most.	This	is	not	without	precedent.	The	U.S.	Home	Owners	Loan	Corporation	had	been	created	for	a	similar	purpose	but	was	disbanded	in	1936.	Had	such	a	Corporation	been	in	existence	in	2007-2008,	it	could	have	done	wonders	for	maintaining	the	liquidity	position	 for	most	mortgagors	and	even	 taken	a	 subordinated	share	 in	the	 housing	 market	 while	 mortgage-lending	 levels	 synced	 with	 nominal	increases	in	median	household	incomes.	Rather	than	buying	up	mortgage	backed	securities	 to	 the	 tune	 of	 $1.8	 trillion,	 an	 assistance	 scheme	 to	 directly	 help	households	to	overcome	their	liquidity	pressures	would	have	been	a	much	more	effective	 way	 in	 avoiding	 the	 rapid	 increase	 in	 unemployment	 levels	 and	 the	subsequent	spike	in	U.S.	government	debt	levels.	Economic	growth	levels	would	also	have	been	higher.	Lenders	should	pay	a	price	to	the	NMB	for	the	reduction	 in	risks	that	 the	NMB	facilitates.	The	borrowers	should	share	-on	a	subordinated	basis-	with	the	NMB	some	of	the	wealth	incorporated	in	the	homes.	With	 the	help	of	an	NMB,	mortgage	borrowers	can	be	helped	–on	a	 temporary	basis-	to	overcome	the	economic	pressures	that	excess	mortgage	lending	levels	have	created	for	them.	This	solution	is	an	economic,	rather	than	a	legal	one	and	such	a	solution	avoids	the	 feedback	 loop	 effects	 as	 spelled	 out	 by	 the	 Bank	 of	 England’s	 financial	stability	report.																																																									4	https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/77060.html	
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The	impact	on	households	If	 economists	 can	 agree	 that	 the	 cause	 of	 the	 financial	 and	 economic	 crisis	 of	2007-2008	 was	 burdening	 households	 with	 more	 mortgage	 debt	 than	 their	income	 growth	 would	 allow	 them	 to	 repay	 -without	 having	 to	 cut	 down	 on	spending	on	other	goods	and	services-,	 then	the	solution	to	solving	or	avoiding	such	 crisis	 in	 future,	 becomes	 clearer.	 A	 direct	 approach	 to	 help	 households	financially	 to	 overcome	 such	 liquidity	 squeeze	 becomes	 more	 rational.	 Such	solution	also	helps	to	restore	or	at	 least	maintain	the	balance	between	the	rich	and	 poorer	 households.	 The	 lower	 income	 households	 do	 not	 lose	 out	 due	 to	lending	 excesses	 organised	 by	 the	 financial	 sector.	 The	 lenders	 will	 need	 to	contribute	to	an	NMB	for	the	lowering	of	their	risks	over	the	mortgage	portfolio.	An	NMB,	once	it	has	been	accepted	as	a	viable	solution,	will	reduce	rather	than	increase	 the	 income	 and	wealth	 gap	 between	 the	 rich	 and	 poor.	Moreover,	 an	economic	 imperfection	 can	 be	 solved	 more	 logically,	 with	 economic	 means,	rather	than	with	the	help	of	the	legal	system.	Economic	growth	levels	should	be	less	affected	as	households	are	enabled	to	continue	to	spend	on	other	goods	and	services.	 Unemployment	 levels	 would	 not	 have	 doubled	 over	 a	 short	 space	 of	time.	Government	debt	levels	would	not	have	risen	so	rapidly	as	they	did	in	the	U.S.	over	the	last	nine	years.		The	stable	door	will	then	remain	shut.			Drs	Kees	De	Koning	Chorleywood,	U.K.	17	October	2017		
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